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Abstract 
The paper questions the need for observational studies to achieve representativeness for real 
populations, in particular for longitudinal studies. It draws upon recent debates and argues 
for the need to distinguish scientific inference from population inference. 
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Introduction 
     In a recent issue of the International Journal of 
Epidemiology (2013, vol 42, 1012-1028) there was a 
debate about whether analysts have overrated, in 
epidemiology and social and medical science more 
generally, the importance of having representative 
samples from well-defined ‘real’ populations. In this 
paper the arguments are summarised and 
developed to understand how they might affect, in 
particular, longitudinal studies. 
Setting out the arguments 
     The lead paper in this collection by Rothman, 
Gallacher and Hatch (2013a) argues that efforts to 
obtain samples that are representative of real 
populations are often misplaced and that scientific 
research questions in epidemiology (and the human 
sciences more generally) are usually better tackled 
by sampling purposively. By this they mean 
selecting groups for study that are directly relevant 
for the comparisons or relationships of interest, 
rather than attempting to estimate such 
relationships within any specific ‘real’ population. 
They claim that the key scientific criterion should be 
the attempt to replicate (generalise) findings across 
different populations and groups. Any failure to 
replicate can then lead to a study of those factors 
that differ among groups and which might explain 
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varying relationships. Thus, for example, replication 
across different ethnic groups, need not involve 
representative samples from a population 
containing such groups, but rather ensuring that 
data are representative of the groups in question 
and not subject, for example, to selection bias.  
     They suggest that traditional emphasis on 
statistical significance and obtaining population-
unbiased estimates downplays the importance of 
the scientific need for generalisation and 
replication. As an example they talk about sampling 
equal numbers in age groups rather than 
attempting to match the distribution to the 
distribution within a population. This particular 
argument, however, seems weak since, in fact, like 
the example of ethnic groups, this can be regarded 
simply as a stratified population sample which, 
combined with suitable weights, can also be used to 
make population inferences.  They also appear to be 
concerned largely with the situation where there 
are pre-existing hypotheses or comparisons of 
interest, whereas in reality populations are often 
representatively sampled in order to allow 
exploratory analyses that rely on sufficient diversity 
and heterogeneity within the population.  
     They also seek to make a clear distinction 
between descriptive statistics that require 
representative samples and analytical statistics that 
attempt to address scientific hypotheses. In fact, 
this distinction is often far from clear and I shall 
return to this point later where I also discuss what 
exactly is meant by a ‘population’. 
Four sets of authors provide responses to 
Rothman’s paper, three of whom are broadly 
supportive (Elwood; Nohr & Gleen; Richiardi,  Pizzi 
& Pearce, 2013). I shall deal with these first, then 
look at the paper (Ebrahim & Davey-Smith, 2013) 
that takes a somewhat different view and then refer 
to a rebuttal by Rothman and colleagues (2013b).  
     Elwood (2013) makes the point that that any real 
population is a historical entity, and when 
inferences about it are available it may have 
changed in important ways. Of course, for 
enumeration purposes, this may still be the best 
information available. For scientific purposes, 
however, the real population serves as an instance 
of an underlying process that generates a data set 
at a particular time, and where inference is to all 
possible instances. This is often referred to as a 
superpopulation approach and the actual real 
population is treated as if it were a sample from 
such a conceptually infinite population. Thus, the 
actual population serves as a useful data set for 
exploratory purposes or to test hypotheses within a 
heterogeneous sample.  
     All these three respondents point to the 
importance of taking account of possible 
confounders and see this as a key concern for 
scientific purposes. There is some discussion about 
choosing unrepresentative samples with a high 
response rate as being preferable to choosing 
representative samples with a low response rate. 
The idea of a purposive sample that can achieve a 
high response rate is an interesting one, but its 
success depends crucially on knowing the relevant 
characteristics of the sample. Examples where this 
might be the case are the use of internet-based 
surveys and in some cases of clinical trials. In 
longitudinal studies it is similar to the way in which 
attrition may be handled. Such studies often settle 
down to having a fairly stable sample that has a high 
response rate in repeated waves. Because the initial 
sample is often fairly representative the 
characteristics of these initial respondents can be 
used to ‘adjust’ subsequent analyses to avoid 
attrition biases.  
     The contribution by Ebrahim and Davey-Smith 
(2013) seeks to disagree with Rothman and 
colleagues on several points. They discuss the cases 
where non-representative samples, in particular 
randomised controlled trials (RCT), give results 
different to those from representative samples. 
They suggest that ‘volunteer bias’ may distort non-
representative studies, including RCT’s, and that 
representative sample inferences may be more 
trustworthy. They point to the example of the 
United Kingdom biobank which is not only 
unrepresentative but also has a very low response 
rate of 6%. They claim that this will not matter in 
terms of genetic associations since these are 
unlikely to be associated with selection and not 
susceptible to influence by confounders such as, for 
example, social class. Both of these statements, 
however, seem disputable, especially in terms of 
gene-environment interactions, and would require 
strong supporting evidence for general acceptance.  
     The final rebuttal by Rothman et al. (2013b) 
reiterates many of the original points. They use the 
example of the Doll/Hill smoking and lung cancer 
study to emphasise the importance of 
representativeness, although this is really an 
argument about observational studies versus RCTs 
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and doesn’t add anything new. They also discuss the 
meaning of the statistical term ‘bias’ and the 
importance of being clear what this refers to. This is 
an important issue and I will return to it below. 
Defining populations 
     It is pertinent to ask what is meant by the term 
‘population’ and the associated issue of what is 
meant by ‘bias’. From a statistical viewpoint these 
are technical terms. Statistical analysis aims to 
provide estimates for a collection of units (people, 
institutions etc.) that, at least notionally, can be 
resampled. Any particular sample is regarded 
(perhaps conditional on particular variable values, 
such as belonging to a given age group) as randomly 
selected in the case of classical inference or as being 
‘exchangeable’ in terms of Bayesian inference. This 
collection of units is a population. It may be real in 
the sense that it can repeatedly be sampled or 
conceptual in the sense that any realised sample is 
considered to be drawn at random from it 
(exchangeable with respect to all other possible 
draws) – a superpopulation. For example, we can 
define the population of women who smoke in the 
second trimester of pregnancy as all women who 
have, or could ever be observed to have, this 
characteristic.  Any scientifically generalisable 
statement will be one about the distribution of any 
of their characteristics and relationships. The term 
‘bias’ is defined in terms of the extent to which the 
estimates obtained from any particular sample 
differ from the (unknown) distribution in this 
population. Thus, from a statistical viewpoint, the 
population does have to be well defined in terms of 
being able to describe its characteristics, but it does 
not have to correspond to any actual ‘real’ 
population. Unfortunately, there is sometimes 
confusion between these uses of the term 
population, but here I use it in the sense of a well-
defined collection of units rather than any human 
population that actually exists or has existed.  
     In the case of longitudinal data there is a special 
problem. Suppose we sample randomly from a real 
population, for example all births in a given country. 
After the first contact with respondents, the 
relationship with this real population will change. 
Thus, some individuals will emigrate and when 
reporting on relationships across time, in terms of 
population representativeness we will need to 
choose whether the relevant population consists of 
those individuals present in the country at a 
subsequent occasion, including immigrants, or 
those who were present at the start and did not 
emigrate.  If it is the latter then we may anticipate 
that as time goes on the relationships estimated are 
less and less appropriate for the individuals who 
currently make up the population (including 
immigrants). If the former, then we may try to 
obtain current representativeness, treating 
unknown early data on immigrants as missing. The 
problem is that in general such earlier data values 
may have different distributions from the earlier 
data values of those present at the start of the 
study. This issue will be especially important if 
immigration status is one of the factors under study. 
In the light of this, thinking about specific 
comparison groups would seem to be a more useful 
focus than attempting to decide how to define 
population representativeness.  
     The argument about the lack of need for a 
representative sample has considerable strength. 
From an analytical (scientific) perspective what is 
required are statements that are generalisable to 
specific groups, including of course those people 
living within a given society or environment at any 
moment and who happen to constitute a ‘real’ 
population, such as is measured by a census. The 
distinction between scientifically driven data 
analysis and analysis directed at making estimates 
for real populations, however, is not always clear. 
For example, if interest is in prevalence differences 
between ethnic groups within age categories, there 
may be scientific interest in whether these are 
changing over time within the same geographically 
defined population, and whether any changes can 
be explained by other factors. In this case successive 
representative samples would be needed. What 
would be gained scientifically from such a 
comparison is information on potentially causal 
factors that mediate or explain the prevalence 
differences. The use of ‘real’ populations for this 
purpose in effect is to take advantage of ‘naturally 
occurring’ changes in such factors that may be 
happening over time. On the other hand it may be 
more efficient to choose a heterogeneous sample 
that allows the same exploration based on having 
sufficient variation for those factors. Thus, if we 
were interested in the relationship between 
pregnancy smoking and neonatal mortality, we 
would not generally wish to derive estimates for a 
real population where the structure of that 
population affected the size of the relationship or 
the power to detect any effects. Thus, for example, 
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in a population with high average birth weight this 
relationship is known to be weak with a very large 
sample size needed to have reasonable power to 
detect it (see for example, Goldstein, 1977). 
Selecting a sample that does not represent a real 
population but has a high degree of heterogeneity 
in terms of birth weight, may provide much more 
power to investigate the hypotheses of interest.   
     We can illustrate this particular point from an 
analysis of early studies that looked at the 
relationship between maternal smoking and 
neonatal or perinatal mortality. Goldstein (1977) 
showed that, for different studies representing 
different populations of pregnant women, the 
difference in (or ratio of) mortality rates between 
smokers and non-smokers increased steadily as the 
average birth weight in the population decreased. 
Table 1 shows this for six different studies. The 
simplest explanation for the relationship is that 
smoking acts on mortality through an average 160g 
reduction in birth weight. The relationship between 
mortality and birth weight is nonlinear, with the 
relationship becoming steeper as birth weight 
decreases, and this implies that we will observe a 
greater difference for those populations with more 
low birth weight babies. In fact, for the two 
populations with the highest average birth weight, 
the difference is negligible.  
     Thus, if we had confined ourselves to the 
‘marginal’ relationship between smoking and 
mortality, then our inferences would have differed 
according to the ‘real’ population studied. From a 
scientific perspective however, such inferences, 
especially in terms of a causal relationship, would 
be inadequate. It illustrates the point that, from a 
scientific perspective, the real population is of 
secondary importance: what we need is to 
understand those factors that could mediate the 
relationship of interest.  
 
Table 1. Maternal smoking in pregnancy and neonatal/perinatal mortality 
Population (1950-1970) % low birth weight 
(<2500g) 
Mortality ratio: smokers/non-
smokers 
US private health 3.2 1.03 
Sweden 3.5 1.01 
US naval wives 4.3 1.32 
Ontario 4.5 1.27 
UK 5.4 1.28 
US general 5.9 1.40 
 
 
     A case where both specific population estimates 
are required and there is sufficient power to 
explore scientifically interesting hypotheses, is the 
British birth cohort known as ‘Life Study’ (Dezateux 
et al., 2013). This has a design that studies all 
60,000 mothers over a period of time during 
pregnancy within relatively small but 
heterogeneous geographic clusters, treated 
effectively as a random sample from a 
superpopulation for those geographic strata, 
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together with a UK random sample over the same 
time period, of some 20,000 live births, treated as a 
random sample from the superpopulation defined 
over the whole country. Both components of the 
study are followed up during the first year of life 
(and potentially beyond) with considerable overlap 
in terms of the information collected. The 
pregnancy component aims to collect genetic and 
other biological data not collected in the birth 
component. The advantage of such a design is that 
for population estimates using variables collected in 
the birth component there is additional information 
available from the numerically larger pregnancy 
component to improve the accuracy of these, for 
example using suitable weights that can be 
computed from nationally available birth data. For 
many scientific hypotheses the data available from 
the pregnancy component alone will often suffice, 
but power can also be increased by using the data 
from the birth component, within a combined 
analysis. Furthermore, informative selection, 
notably as a result of non-response, can be 
addressed by the existence of comprehensive 
population birth registry data against which the 
characteristics of those responding can be checked. 
This is in effect a special case of purposive sampling. 
     The ability to exploit such a design requires 
appropriate software tools that can ‘borrow 
strength’ across the two components. Providing 
such tools for routine data analysis is highly 
desirable, although it may be practically 
challenging. The point, however, is that it helps to 
understand the debate over whether a sample 
should be purposive or representative since in this 
case it can efficiently be both.  
Conclusions 
     The idea that population studies, especially 
longitudinal ones, should strive to be representative 
of ‘real’ populations may not always be helpful. 
While, for certain purposes associated with 
enumeration and administrative policies, real 
population representativeness is required, from a 
scientific perspective this may well be unnecessary. 
Scientific inferences are concerned with uncovering 
relationships that can be tested across different 
contexts and that may eventually attain the status 
of causal explanations. To ensure validity 
researchers need to pay attention to selection 
factors that may lead to biased estimates, where 
‘bias’ is defined in terms of a clearly defined 
statistical (super)population, and much of applied 
statistical methodology is devoted to this issue. To 
enhance the effectiveness of any analysis, 
heterogeneity is generally desirable, and this will 
often imply purposive sampling that is non-
representative of any particular real population. In 
practice, as is the case with Life Study, an optimum 
design may well be one that combines such 
purposive sampling with population 
representativeness, so serving both enumeration 
and scientific aims.  
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The need for representative survey samples 
 
Introduction 
     In any field of scientific endeavour it is healthy 
to challenge orthodoxy. Standard practice should 
not be assumed to be best practice without 
question. Representative sampling is the 
orthodoxy in many applied fields of survey 
research and it is pleasing that this special section 
of Longitudinal and Life Course Studies is 
questioning when and why this should be the 
case. Let us be clear what this debate is not 
about. It is not about how to select a 
representative sample. There is a long history of 
debate on that subject, going back at least as far 
as the foundation of modern survey sampling 
theory with Kiaer (1897) and Neyman (1934), 
given prominence following the 1948 United 
States Presidential Election polling disaster 
(Mosteller, Hyman, McCarthy, Marks & Truman, 
1949), and periodically revisited in various forms 
ever since. My thoughts on the role of non-
probability sampling are recorded in Lynn (2005). 
That debate is again topical currently, particularly 
due to the rise of relatively cheap and fast online 
access panels in the social and political sciences 
(Bosnjak, Das & Lynn, 2015). However, the topic 
here is not how to select a representative sample 
but rather when and why it should be our 
objective to do so. 
What should a sample represent? 
     Survey samples are rarely if ever of inherent 
interest. Rather, a sample is used to make 
broader inferences. Therefore, survey samples 
should be representative of something broader. 
But what? Goldstein’s article touches upon this 
question by drawing distinctions between 
descriptive and analytical statistics and 
highlighting the role of confounding (or 
mediating) variables. I would suggest that if the 
analytical objective is to estimate the association 
between a particular set of variables, then the 
sample should be representative of that 
association. If the objective is to estimate a 
population distribution of some kind (be that 
univariate or multivariate) then the sample 
should be representative of that distribution. 
And so on. If the sample is not representative of 
the set of parameters to be estimated, whether 
those are causal, associative or descriptive, then 
we risk biased estimation, in the statistical sense 
outlined by Goldstein. It could therefore be 
argued that the representativeness objectives for 
a survey sample should depend on the analytical 
objectives1. 
     To take an extreme example, suppose we want 
to estimate the association between two 
variables, when we already know (or assume) this 
association to be linear and already know (or 
assume) that there are no (important) 
confounding variables. If there are truly no 
confounding variables, the association should hold 
in any population, so it matters not whether our 
sample represents any particular population. In 
fact, we only need two non-identical observations 
in order to be able to perfectly estimate the 
bivariate association. This is obviously an 
unrealistic example for survey research (though it 
is exactly the type of estimation that takes place 
in school physics classes, for example), so it 
should be instructive to consider the ways in 
which it is unrealistic. First, it is ambitious to 
suppose that we know in advance the exact form 
of the association. Sampling just a few 
observations from each extreme of the 
distribution should be adequate to estimate a 
linear association, but if the true association has 
some curvature, this may be missed unless we 
have observations from throughout the 
distribution. Second, a complete absence of 
confounding variables is unlikely. Thus, to 
estimate the (conditional) association between 
our two variables of interest, we need also to 
identify (and obtain good measurements of) each 
confounding variable. One could argue, then, that 
a representative sample is not necessary provided 
that we can identify in advance all confounding 
variables of the relationship of interest, and 
measure them with our survey, and provided we 
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ensure that the sample broadly covers the 
distribution of interest. However, this begs the 
question: which distribution? To be able to truly 
generalise our findings, we surely mean the 
distribution of values that could exist in any 
population to which we wish to claim that our 
results apply. Thus, we cannot completely get 
away from the notion of populations. 
     These criteria for being able to rely on a non-
representative sample are quite demanding. It is 
hard to envisage a realistic social science 
research example where we can be confident of 
knowing in advance all possible confounding 
variables (let alone being able to measure them 
all well). When the causal mechanism of interest 
is, say, biological or chemical, one may be able to 
get closer to meeting these criteria - and that is 
a possible reason for epidemiologists to have a 
different take on this debate to social scientists - 
but the fundamental issues are the same. 
     Most social surveys – even those tightly 
focused on a single topic – have multiple analysis 
objectives. Large numbers of estimates of 
different kinds are typically required, making it 
unlikely that all confounding mechanisms are 
known for all analyses. In this situation, as 
pointed out by Goldstein, a population 
representative sample will at least provide a 
means of identifying the form of unexplained 
variation, testing in an exploratory way the 
association of this variation with other variables, 
and thereby moving towards the advancement of 
knowledge about hitherto unidentified causal 
factors. The primary purpose of some surveys – 
and secondary purpose of many – is to provide a 
data resource for research by secondary analysts. 
It is impossible for such research to have been 
specified prior to the original design of the 
survey and therefore to have influenced the 
survey design. In this situation, having a 
population representative sample can be thought 
of as a safety mechanism that ensures that the 
population distribution of the phenomena of 
interest is covered and also permits estimation of 
the extent and nature of unexplained variation. 
Of course, it remains up to the researcher to 
decide whether the particular population covered 
is suitably similar to, or representative of, the 
kind of population to which inferences should be 
made. I return to this issue below. 
 
Which Population? 
     The ultimate objective of most survey-based 
research is to inform policy or practice of some 
kind. With this in mind, my earlier statement 
about wanting a sample to be representative of 
the parameters of interest can be re-cast. The 
parameters of interest are those in the 
population(s) that will be affected by policy or 
practice. Let’s refer to this population as the 
policy population2. So, broadly, we want our 
survey sample to be representative of the policy 
population in terms of the parameters to be 
estimated. How can we be sure that this is the 
case? We can’t. Not least because the policy 
population is always, by definition, a future 
population and we can never perfectly predict 
the future. But there are two things we can do: 
 
a) try to minimise the risk that our 
parameters of interest differ 
greatly between the study 
population and the policy 
population, by defining the 
study population appropriately; 
b) try to predict or model relevant ways 
in which the policy population may 
differ from the study population and 
incorporate this into our estimation. 
 
     Step a) is typically achieved by studying the 
most recent available equivalent of the relevant 
future population. Thus, in 2015 we may be 
able to analyse data from a representative 
sample of the 2014 population of Great Britain, 
for example, in order to infer the likely effects of 
a policy that might be implemented in 2016. 
Our assumption is that the 2016 population will 
be broadly similar to the 2014 one in terms of 
the relevant (causal) parameters. However, we 
do not expect the population structure to be 
identical: based on recent trends, we may expect 
some net ageing and some net immigration, for 
example, in which case we can implement step 
b) by projecting our estimated parameters onto 
the predicted 2016 population structure. 
     The example of the previous paragraph is an 
optimistic scenario, where the study population 
and policy population have a very large overlap, 
though even in this case the overlap may not be 
as large as it seems. Policies often remain in 
place for many years, and can have long-lasting 
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impacts, so the true policy population perhaps 
consists of people resident in Britain at any time 
over the subsequent several years or decades. 
And often study and policy populations are even 
further disconnected. For example, if a good 
survey-based study has been carried out in one 
country, should researchers and policy-makers in 
another country assume that the findings will 
apply to their situation too? This is a common 
dilemma. 
     Funders must decide whether it is worth 
investing considerable resources to replicate a 
study carried out in a different context. They 
should be guided by the principles set out above. 
It is only worth funding the replication study if 
there is a sufficiently strong probability that the 
key parameters of interest are substantially 
different. Interpreting concepts such as 
“sufficiently strong probability” and “substantially 
different” will of course be subjective, but can be 
guided by knowledge of pertinent differences 
between the two populations and, particularly, by 
study findings regarding important confounders 
and unexplained variance. 
    Relevant policy populations can be very 
different for different types of research. Medical 
researchers may often hope that their findings 
could be generalisable to almost all current and 
future human populations (barring changes in 
the underlying etiology), whereas public bodies 
concerned with administering healthcare, 
education, housing, social support and so on are 
generally responsible for populations that are 
clearly defined by geography, usually at a 
national, regional, or local level. In the latter 
case, researchers may use survey samples that 
are representative of a recent equivalent of the 
same geographically-defined population or may 
resort to similarity-of-parameters arguments in 
using data from a different population (for 
example, arguing that national findings should 
apply in each region of the country). 
Longitudinal Surveys 
     The arguments that I have presented so far are 
rather general and should apply to any sample-
based scientific endeavour. However, longitudinal 
studies in the social sciences have at least three 
additional distinct characteristics that should 
influence the answer to the question posed in the 
title of Goldstein’s paper: 
 
a) Longitudinal estimates by definition refer 
to longitudinal populations; 
b) The time interval between data collection 
and policy impact can be particularly 
great; 
c) During the course of the study, new 
research agendas can emerge that 
were not envisaged when the study 
was initially designed. 
 
I discuss here each of these three points in turn. 
     Any human population (‘real’ population, in 
Goldstein’s terms) is dynamic; people will join or 
leave the population over time. Analysts of cross-
sectional surveys tend to ignore this 
uncomfortable fact and instead claim that their 
estimates relate to a well-defined population that 
existed at a moment in time. This may be a 
reasonable approximation to reality for many 
purposes, but the longer the period of time over 
which elements were sampled or data collected, 
the less accurate the approximation will be. 
     Longitudinal surveys cannot duck this issue. An 
estimate of, say, the relationship between a 
treatment or baseline measurement and an 
outcome ten years later can only be based on a 
sample of people who were in the ‘real’ 
population at both points in time. People who 
entered the ‘real’ population subsequent to the 
baseline measurement (e.g. through birth, 
migration or status change) or who left the ‘real’ 
population prior to the outcome measurement 
cannot contribute to the estimate. The study 
population can therefore be defined as persons 
who were members of the ‘real’ population at 
both time points. Longitudinal parameters are 
properties of longitudinal populations (Smith, Lynn 
& Elliot, 2009), whether the population is ‘real’ or 
a conceptual superpopulation. The distinction 
between cross-sectional and longitudinal 
representativeness is important (Lynn, 2011). 
     Research based on long-term longitudinal 
studies is incredibly powerful for understanding 
dynamics and causality over long periods. The 
down side of this is that some of the data 
underpinning the research will be rather old. A 
study of the influence of infant feeding practices 
on, say, educational and employment outcomes 
by age 30 must rely on feeding practice data that 
is at least 30 years old. The study population 
and policy population are therefore separated 
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not by just a couple of years, as in the example 
of the previous section, but by four decades or 
more. This makes it harder for the researcher to 
be confident that key population parameters will 
remain unchanged: in a rapidly-changing world, 
not only may feeding practices themselves have 
changed, but so might the many mediators of 
their impacts on early-adulthood outcomes. 
     Research agendas certainly evolve over time, 
due to new knowledge, new technology, new 
social problems, and so on. When the sample 
design for the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) was established, in the 1950s, it would 
have been impossible to envisage the myriad 
purposes for which researchers would be using 
the data half a century later. For this reason, the 
role of population representative sampling in 
ensuring the sample will contain as much 
heterogeneity as exists in the population is 
particularly important. The heterogeneity will be 
present for any research objective, not just those 
that were identified when the study was 
conceptualised. 
Conclusion 
     The omission of the word ‘population’ from the 
title of this piece is deliberate: survey samples 
certainly need to be representative, but not 
necessarily of a conventionally-defined 
population. To meet scientific objectives, samples 
should represent the estimation parameters of 
interest. How this is best achieved will depend 
largely on how much is known about these 
parameters prior to the study. When little is 
known, and particularly when some research 
objectives cannot be well specified in advance, 
population representative sampling provides a 
mechanism for ensuring representation of extant 
variance. For multi-purpose surveys, population 
representative sampling is likely to represent an 
efficient compromise between the diverse optimal 
sample distributions for different analytical 
purposes. The sample should represent a 
population that is as similar as possible to the 
future policy population(s) that may be affected 
by study findings. A good choice may be a recent 
equivalently-defined population, especially when 
this maximises overlap between the study 
population and the policy population. 
     Longitudinal studies are typically characterised 
by the features that point towards population 
representative sampling as an appropriate 
strategy (limited advance knowledge about 
estimation parameters, inability to specify all 
estimation requirements in advance, large time 
interval between data collection and policy 
implementation). 
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Endnotes 
1 
Kruskal and Mosteller (1979) distinguish estimation bias from selection bias. Goldstein notes that unbiased estimators can be 
constructed from biased samples, provided the biasing selection mechanism is known, as with the case of disproportionate stratified 
probability sampling. In this brief note I shall fudge this issue: my use of the term population representative sample includes – but is 
not necessarily limited to – any probability-based sample that covers the whole population. 
 
2 
I deliberately avoid the term target population, as this is usually used in a more restrictive sense. However, under an explicit 
superpopulation model the two concepts converge. 
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Commentary by  Graciela Muniz-Terrera University of Edinburgh, UK 
G.Muniz@ed.ac.uk      
Rebecca Hardy University College London, UK 
 
 Some thoughts about representativeness 
 
     The paper by Goldstein makes an important 
additional contribution to the ongoing debate 
about whether and when analytic samples need to 
be population representative in studies in 
epidemiology and social and medical research. 
      The paper outlines the arguments presented by 
Rothman, Gallacher and Hatch (2013) and the 
stimulating accompanying commentaries that 
initiated the recent discussion on the topic. The 
need to distinguish between a “real” population 
and a population defined as a statistical concept 
that refers to any well-defined collection of units, 
but that may not reflect any actual population is 
also discussed. Additionally, Goldstein recalls the 
definition of bias as the difference between 
estimates obtained from any particular sample and 
the unknown true parameter of the population 
under study, emphasising that this population only 
has to be a statistically defined population and not 
a “real” population. In this paper, we comment on a 
number of points which have particular relevance 
for birth cohort and longitudinal studies.  
      The discussion of the temporal aspect of the 
concept of representativeness is, of course, 
important. Goldstein points out that 
representativeness is not a static concept that is 
preserved indefinitely over time, but rather, is a 
concept affected by the passing of time. Even when 
all efforts are made to select a representative 
sample of a given population at the outset of a 
study, the representativeness of this initial sample 
is unlikely to be preserved over time as the sample 
is followed up longitudinally. The real population of 
which the sample was initially representative will 
inevitably evolve, while at the same time loss to 
follow up will alter the characteristics of the study 
sample. Goldstein cites the example of the ‘Life 
Study’, the newest of the British birth cohort 
studies, where a complex sampling strategy and the 
use of weighting allows both the estimation of 
population parameters with adequate accuracy and 
the investigation of scientific hypotheses in a group 
with more extensive biological data.  Let us now 
consider the oldest of the British birth cohort 
studies, the MRC National Survey of Health and 
Development (NSHD) (Wadsworth, Kuh, Richards & 
Hardy, 2006). The NSHD followed up a sample of all 
single births to married women in England, Scotland 
and Wales which took place in one week in March 
1946. This initial sample included all babies born to 
women with husbands in non-manual and 
agricultural employment and one in four births to 
women with husbands in manual employment. This 
sampling scheme was chosen to keep the national 
distribution and to achieve a similar proportion of 
children in each social group (Wadsworth, 1991).  
Weights have thus been used when calculating 
prevalence estimates in order to allow for this 
original sampling. In 2015, the cohort is now aged 
69 and the 24th data collection on the whole sample 
is taking place. Of course, the NSHD sample are no 
longer representative of the population of 
individuals aged 69 years old now living in England, 
Scotland and Wales. Demographic changes have 
occurred, with both immigration and emigration 
taking place over the lifetime of the cohort. Hence, 
any prevalence estimates can only ever be 
representative of the British-born population of 69 
year olds. Furthermore, the diverse origins of 
immigrants joining the British population will mean 
that they have been exposed to different early life 
conditions compared with the British born 
population. Such differences in early life experience 
are likely to impact on adult health and mortality 
patterns and could thus affect estimates of 
association between early life risk and adult 
outcomes. 
      This raises the question of whether national 
cohort studies should adopt the practice of 
supplementing the samples to try and maintain 
study representativeness.  Such supplementation 
was not attempted in the NSHD. In contrast, in the 
1958 British Birth Cohort (National Child 
Development Study) and the 1970 British Birth 
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Cohort, during childhood, as cohort members could 
be traced through schools, immigrants born in the 
reference week were added to the samples. This 
was no longer possible once cohort members 
became adults (Power & Elliott, 2006, Elliott & 
Shepherd, 2006). We appreciate the value of such 
attempts to retain representativeness, but also see 
challenges in this practice if the distribution of the 
subgroups that comprise the original population is 
also dynamic and vary significantly over time. The 
innovative design of the ‘Life study’ (Dezateux et al., 
2013) means that the initial sample is both 
“purposive and representative” and it will be 
informative to see how appropriate software tools 
for routine and complex  data analysis can be 
provided.  It will also be interesting to see whether 
representativeness can be maintained as the 
sample is followed up longitudinally, as loss to 
follow up and continuous demographic changes to 
the population occur. Given the richness of the data 
available in cohort studies and their ability to 
address unique scientific hypotheses about long 
term associations, we need to consider whether 
attempting to retain representatives by sample 
supplementation or by statistical weighting for 
investigations of prevalence is the best use of such 
studies. 
     In the original exchange between Rothman and 
others, Elwood (2013) elaborated the concept that 
any real population is a historical entity and that by 
the time inferences about the population are 
available,  the initial population may have changed 
in important ways. We now reflect on how period 
effects can affect inferences made using historical 
data. As an example, let us consider the association 
of smoking and cognitive function in school pupils 
aged 15. Assume we have data for two samples of 
children that were representative of the school 
population aged 15 at the time of data collection, 
such that one sample comprised of students aged 
15 years old in 1982 and the other of students aged 
15 in 2013. Smoking prevalence in these two 
samples born 30 years apart will vary greatly. In 
1982, 24 % of pupils aged 15 smoked, a percentage 
that has been decreasing steadily over time  so that 
by 2013 only 8 % of pupils smoked 
(www.ash.org.uk) as a consequence of heightened 
awareness of its negative effects on health and 
various changes in laws,  public health and 
commercial policies. A lack of power to detect an 
effect of smoking on cognitive function could 
therefore result as the prevalence of the risk factor 
declines. So, even when both samples were chosen 
to be representative of the population of pupils 
aged 15, because of a period effect, different 
conclusions about the association of interest could 
be drawn. If the researcher is interested in the 
potential causal association between smoking and 
cognition, then selecting a population with a higher 
prevalence of smoking is more important than 
picking one which is representative. On the other 
hand a risk factor might become more prevalent 
over time and thus associations may not be picked 
up in historical cohorts. For example, the 
prevalence of childhood obesity was considerably 
lower in the NSHD compared with cohorts born in 
the 1990s and later (Johnson, Li, Kuh & Hardy, 
2015). It is therefore unclear whether the generally 
null associations between body mass index (BMI) in 
early childhood and coronary heart disease (CHD) 
observed in historical cohorts (Owen et al., 2009) 
are due to a lack of power. Such historical 
differences need to be considered and discussed 
when, for example, synthesizing results in 
systematic reviews and when implementing 
evidence based public health policies.  
     Finally, an interesting argument presented by 
Goldstein and discussed in the original exchange 
between Rothman and other commentators is 
about the value of non-representative samples in 
the context of replication and generalisation of 
results across different populations. The 
importance of a thorough understanding of all the 
potential sources of heterogeneity across studies, 
including the representativeness, or not, of 
samples, and the period effects, as well as 
differences in data collection methods and analytic 
methods when evaluating the reproducibility of 
results is vital. These points are of particular 
relevance in the heated debate about 
reproducibility and replicability of results that has 
entertained the attention of researchers across 
various scientific areas (Francis, 2012; Ioannidis, 
Nosek & Iorns, 2012; McNutt, 2014; Mulkay & 
Gilbert, 1986), particularly when reproducibility is 
defined as the conceptual replication of 
experiments as conceived by Drummond (2009). 
Despite unfortunate publishing practices that 
discourage publication of  reports that aim at 
testing reproducible research and result in 
publication biases (Francis, 2012), the concept of 
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reproducible research has, historically,  been at the 
core of scientific discovery. 
     From that perspective, the need to generate 
strong evidence about patterns of associations is at 
the core of the multi-study work fostered by the 
Integrative Analysis of longitudinal Studies of 
Ageing network, a network of longitudinal studies 
of ageing (www.ialsa.org). Researchers affiliated to 
the IALSA network independently analyse data from 
multiple studies employing a coordinated approach 
that involves the consistent use of the same 
analytical method (identical analytical model where 
possible and consistent coding of harmonized 
variables where possible). This coordinated 
analytical approach maximises the ability to fairly 
compare results and enables the examination of 
consistency of patterns and of associations across 
samples that may differ in a variety of ways, 
including differences by  geographical location,  
sample composition and representativeness  
(Piccinin). The use of the same analytical approach 
reduces the potential sources of heterogeneity 
across studies that may emerge from the use of 
different statistical methodologies to answer similar 
questions. Consistent results generated from 
diverse samples are reassuring and provide stronger 
evidence in support of the hypothesis tested. On 
the other hand, inconsistent results require a 
thoughtful evaluation of potential reasons that may 
explain the divergence of results, including 
differences that may emerge from features of the 
data (including representativeness), and  sample 
composition and sampling procedures.  For 
example, in an investigation of the association of 
the effect of education, age and sex on global 
cognitive function measured using the Mini Mental 
State Exam in six international longitudinal studies 
of ageing, Piccinin and colleagues (2012) found that 
education was positively associated with 
performance across all six studies,  but was only 
associated with rate of decline in the  cohort 
containing the oldest participants. In five of the six 
studies, estimates of rate of decline were also 
found to be similar, but in the cohort of oldest 
individuals, individuals were found to decline at a 
much faster rate than in the other samples. The 
authors report that an investigation of the sample 
composition and a better examination of the 
sampling procedure followed in this outlying study 
helped them understand that dementia cases had 
been handled differently in the study compared to 
the other studies. Indeed, in this study efforts had 
been made to keep individuals who developed 
dementia in the study, whereas in all the other 
studies individuals with dementia were not included 
in the follow up samples. When individuals with 
dementia were removed from the sample, the 
estimated rate of decline aligned to the rate of 
decline estimated in the other five studies. 
     The general discussion about representativeness 
and Goldstein’s contribution with particular 
relevance to longitudinal studies and their historical 
context is very valuable. This discussion is helpful in 
raising awareness among researchers to think more 
about when representativeness is a problem, but 
also to appreciate when to value a lack of 
representativeness.  
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Commentary by  Colm O’Muircheartaigh University of Chicago, US 
caomuirc@uchicago.edu  
 
Why we need population representative samples 
 
     Goldstein questions the need for observational 
studies to achieve representativeness for well-
defined populations, in particular for longitudinal 
studies. While he recognises the distinction 
between the notions of representativeness and 
proportionality, he fails to acknowledge the 
importance of distinguishing between samples of 
convenience and targeted samples from special 
subpopulations. In this note I emphasise the critical 
significance of probability sampling, in contrast to 
purposive sampling, and draw special attention to 
the artificial distinction between descriptive and 
analytical statistics. Goldstein (correctly) draws 
attention to the confusion between disproportional 
sampling and non-representative sampling but fails 
to recognise the inferential implications of choosing 
between probability samples and nonprobability 
samples. A probability sample is in essence a 
sample in which every element of the population 
has a (known) non-zero probability of selection; the 
definition of the population may be such that it 
does not correspond to a real population. The 
structure of a probability sample from a (general) 
population may exclude some domains from the 
target population and may be modified by design in 
order to produce appropriate numbers of cases for 
particular comparisons of subsamples of that target 
population.  Probability samples have particular 
strength in making inferences, whether for scientific 
or for policy purposes. 
Defining populations 
     All inference is, by definition, to a population 
beyond the sample on which the inference is based. 
Much of the argument in Goldstein, and in the 
papers he references, has to do with the definition 
of this inferential population. I concur that the 
population must be clearly defined; I accept also 
that it may not correspond to a “real” population at 
a point in time. However, unless it can be defined in 
such a way that a sample may be selected from it, 
there will be no scientific foundation for inferences 
to it without untestable assumptions about 
freedom from bias. 
     Consider first the case where the purpose is to 
represent a national population; as an example, 
consider the selection of a sample for the United 
States (US) National Children’s Study (NCS)(Michael 
& O’Muircheartaigh, 2008). In designing a nationally 
representative sample for this study, the purpose is 
not to address every subpopulation of interest in 
the US.  The purpose is to insure that every element 
in the population has a non-zero probability of 
being selected into the sample.  This is achieved by 
identifying a survey population that is defined to be 
as close to the target population as feasible, such 
that it reflects both measurable and unmeasurable 
characteristics of that population 
     Suppose that we are interested in the 
relationship between an environmental exposure X 
and a health outcome Y, which can be modeled (for 
simplicity) as the linear function Y=a+bX+e.  If all 
people in the population have the same b, then the 
nature of the sample does not matter because as 
long as X is accurately measured we will have only 
random measurement error in Y.  However, if there 
are confounding factors Z, which affect Y and are 
related to X, then our estimate of b may be biased 
unless the elements of Z are controlled.  If Z is 
known, then model-based estimates of the 
relationship between X and Y can be obtained that 
control for Z and yield an unbiased estimate of b, 
again regardless of the sampling design.  However, 
there may also be moderator variables W, which 
interact with X in influencing Y.  Here, different 
individuals will have different values of b depending 
on the elements in W.  If W is known, then we can 
include interactions in the model and the separate 
estimates of b will also be unbiased.  
     Unfortunately in practice W and Z are at least to 
some extent unknown and in the case of 
longitudinal studies like the NCS are likely to evolve 
over time.  Some elements of Z and W may be 
known but are unmeasurable and others may 
simply be unknown at the time.  Here, the best that 
we can do is to provide an average effect b.  To do 
so, however, requires that we create a sample that 
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fully reflects the population of interest, a 
probability sample drawn from the population so 
that our estimate of b is an unbiased estimate of 
the average effect in the population or in a defined 
subgroup. The probability sample guarantees that 
we will (in expectation) cover the range of 
confounding variables proportionately. 
     It is also possible that the interest is not in the 
average effect but in the effect on specific 
subgroups of this general population (as in the birth 
weight example below). Thus, in the NCS we might 
wish to focus on particular ethnic groups or on the 
comparison of these groups. In this case to 
maximize power for the comparison we would take 
equal numbers of cases from the groups of interest, 
rather than numbers proportional to their 
distribution in the general population. These 
subsamples would however be chosen to be 
representative of the groups of interest; their 
representativeness would be warranted by the fact 
that they were probability samples from their 
respective groups. Only the relative sizes of the 
subsamples would deviate from the parent 
population, not the intrinsic nature of the sampling 
process. 
     Goldstein’s example of the relationship between 
pregnancy smoking and neonatal mortality provides 
a further illustration of this principle. The six studies 
he cites (from an analysis by Goldstein (1977)) 
demonstrate a non-linear relationship between 
mortality and birth weight, with a negligible effect 
for the two populations with the highest average 
birth weight, and an increasingly steep relationship 
as the population average birth weight decreases.  
     Goldstein argues that this example demonstrates 
the secondary importance of the population. To the 
contrary, the data demonstrate the opposite. Had 
the range of birth weights across the US been 
included in a single US study, the analysts might 
have been more likely to observe the non-linearity 
in the relationship; this indicates the importance of 
covering the full range of variation of X, W, and Z in 
a population rather than accepting the 
subpopulation that is most convenient. One might 
indeed argue that there was a failure of both the 
theoretical basis and the analysis of the studies in 
not examining the data for possible interactions 
with birth weig 
ht in the model,  
     At no point in his disquisition does Goldstein 
suggest that the samples in any of the studies he 
cites should be “non-representative”. The implicit 
understanding is that the sample in each is in fact 
representative of the population from which it is 
drawn. Were it not, neither the partial 
generalisation within the study would be justified, 
nor would its incorporation into Goldstein’s 1977 
meta-analysis. 
Two-phase sampling 
     The case of the British birth cohort known as the 
‘Life Study’ is also subject to an alternative 
interpretation from that offered in Goldstein. A 
geographically clustered sample of 60,000 mothers 
is selected from a set of relatively small but 
geographically heterogeneous clusters; the 60,000 
mothers are assumed to constitute a random 
sample from a set of geographic strata; there is a 
parallel (random) UK sample of 20,000 live births. 
The two samples can be used together to “borrow 
strength” from each other for different analyses. 
Comprehensive national (population) data from 
birth registries can be used to correct for 
differential nonresponse. 
     This combining of samples with different 
characteristics and different intensity of 
measurement is well recognised as a powerful 
design. The classic two-phase sampling design 
(Neyman, 1938) proposes just this combination of 
general representation and subsample focus; 
Neyman visualizes both samples as probability 
samples. Goldstein proposes this as a special case of 
purposive sampling, though it is not clear what his 
argument is. Presumably he does not argue that 
selecting the geographical areas purposively is 
superior to a design in which the areas were 
selected on a probability basis from a properly 
constructed frame of geographical areas. If indeed 
the selected areas were for some reason the only 
areas available, then suspicion must attach to them 
as being unrepresentative even of areas with 
ostensibly equivalent characteristics. 
     The extent to which the combined sample can be 
justifiably used to make inferences to the whole 
population depends critically on either (i) both 
samples being probability samples, or (ii) model-
based assumptions that allow generalisation from 
the purposive component to the whole. 
Additional benefits of representation 
through probability sampling 
A platform for scientific discovery 
COMMENT AND DEBATE 
   
 
464 
     Hypotheses about new exposures and gene-by-
environment moderation will arise over the next 20 
years, and a probability sample provides the best 
insurance that the study will provide useful 
numbers of children with variation in those 
environments and exposures of interest. The 
probability design also increases the prospects for 
serendipity by maximizing the spread of W and Z in 
the sample. 
Maximization of scientific acceptability of data 
and of discoveries across disciplines 
     While many disciplines do not require probability 
samples for their inferences, no discipline considers 
a probability sample to be inferior to an alternative. 
Thus data based on a probability sample maximize 
the potential for cross-disciplinary collaboration and 
publication. 
Public and political/policy acceptance 
     Resource allocation and acceptability of 
discoveries will be greater if the data are based on a 
scientifically warranted representative sample of 
the population. 
Full variation in risks and exposures 
     A probability sample will produce generalisable 
risk estimates and the capability to estimate 
policy/intervention benefits from associations 
discovered and reported from the study. 
Conclusion 
     Investigations of all kinds can make a 
contribution to science, and samples that are not 
representative have a place in scientific research, 
especially at early stages of exploration. I contend 
however that the superficial message of Goldstein’s 
excellent article is wrong. Ceteris paribus, for both 
science and policy a probability sample is superior 
to a non-probability sample, representation trumps 
convenience, and the best way to obtain 
representation of the population of interest is 
through probability methods. 
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Commentary  by  Chris Skinner  London School of Economics, UK 
     c.j.skinner@lse.ac.uk  
 
Discussion of ‘When and why do we need population representative samples?’ 
 
     There is much wisdom in this paper by Harvey 
Goldstein which builds on discussion in a set of 
papers in the International Journal of Epidemiology 
(IJE), and applies the ideas developed to a new 
British birth cohort study, the Life Study. I shall 
focus on his main theme, which rejects the need for 
representative samples, and on his concluding 
remarks relating to the Life Study. My comments 
come particularly from a survey statistics 
perspective.  
     I was reminded in looking at the papers in IJE of 
the observation by Kruskal and Mosteller (1979) 
(and in their three related articles) that the term 
‘representative sample’ has multiple uses and 
“because of its ambiguities and imprecision”, they 
“recommend great caution” in the use of this term 
and “usually a more specific expression will add 
clarity” (p.13). I shall seek to make greater use of 
the expressions ‘population’, ‘sample’ and ‘bias’ in 
my discussion.  
     As I understand Goldstein’s main concern about 
representative sampling, it is that, for scientific 
purposes, making inference about ‘real’ populations 
is of secondary importance. This is a position which 
I should like to question. The survey statistics 
literature does make a distinction between 
descriptive/enumerative and analytic/scientific uses 
of surveys/studies. Estimation for a single study 
population is a common primary objective for the 
former. For the latter, the focus of Goldstein’s 
paper, I think the notion of population will 
invariably need further refinement, but I think it can 
still serve a useful purpose to specify collections of 
units underlying targets for inference. I do not feel 
the need to downplay the notion of ‘real’ 
population.  
Perhaps the simplest definition of populations of 
interest for scientific purposes is where there are 
two subpopulations to compare. I conceive of these 
subpopulations as ‘real populations’ in Goldstein’s 
terminology. Suppose, for example, we wish to 
undertake a comparison of an outcome Y, according 
to values of X, given confounding factors Z (say 
infant mortality by maternal smoking given birth 
weight in Goldstein’s example). For such conditional 
analysis, it would be natural to define specific 
subpopulations by X and Z, between which 
comparisons are to be made. Thus, in the example, 
one might choose to compare a low birth weight 
subpopulation and a normal birth weight 
subpopulation. Such comparisons have many vital 
roles in scientific research, as Goldstein notes. They 
may help to elicit and test causal hypotheses, 
perhaps through control of confounding factors. 
They may be valuable in assessing the replicability 
of findings across populations or to learn about 
interactions. 
     Given the specification of such subpopulations, it 
will often make sense to sample these 
subpopulations with different sampling fractions. 
For example, as discussed by Goldstein, the power 
to investigate the analytic objectives may be 
improved by sampling the low birth weight 
subpopulation with a higher relative sampling 
fraction. But I do not see this observation as any 
reason why the subpopulations (as real 
populations) are of ‘secondary importance’. Their 
definition seems fundamental. I also do not see any 
reason why an analysis embracing a comparison of 
such subpopulations need be weighted to the 
population of all births (Skinner, 2005, p.84), let 
alone any need for the analysis to be confined to 
the ‘marginal’ relationship between smoking and 
mortality. 
     The simple comparison of subpopulations needs 
extension in various ways. With a continuous 
variable like birth weight, the definition of 
subpopulations via cut-points is arbitrary and we 
may imagine intervals of values of decreasing width 
and decreasing population counts. In this context, 
the notion of superpopulation which Goldstein 
mentions is useful and enables, for example, a 
regression relationship with continuous covariates 
to be specified in usual model terms. The 
longitudinal setting also introduces complexities, as 
Goldstein notes. A population like a labour force 
becomes dynamic with people entering and leaving 
the labour force over time. Even more complexity 
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arises with, for example, households with the 
structure of the unit changing over time. In such 
cases, the term ‘population’ may seem stretched, 
but I think it is still reasonable to think in terms of 
what Goldstein calls a ‘well-defined collection of 
units’. Causal questions cannot be assessed from 
data on a single case but rather require reference to 
a set of units. As Holland (1986, p. 947) writes, “the 
important point is that the statistical solution [to 
the fundamental problem of causal inference] 
replaces the impossible-to-observe causal effect of t 
on a specific unit with the possible-to-estimate 
average causal effect of t over a population of 
units”. In my view the relevant populations do 
define ‘real’ notions of primary not secondary 
importance, given the need to report scientific 
findings transparently in terms of the kinds of 
people or other units to which they apply.    
     I now turn to the role of sample selection. I have 
already noted, in agreement with Goldstein’s 
discussion, that it may often be sensible to allocate 
the sample differentially according to variables of 
scientific interest (X and Z above) with a view to 
improving sampling efficiency (i.e. reducing 
variance). Consider next the question of bias, as 
arising from differences between the characteristics 
of sample units and those in the population (as 
conceived of in the previous three paragraphs). I 
have in mind bias arising from purposive and other 
forms of non-probability sampling, for example the 
volunteer effects described by Ebrahim and Davey-
Smith (2013). Such bias is of major concern to 
survey methodologists today, with the relentless 
push to adopt non-probability samples, such as in 
internet panels, for cost and other non-scientific 
reasons.  
In summary, I do think that in the analysis of 
longitudinal studies it is desirable to specify 
collections of units as populations, with a clear 
scientific rationale, and that the potential biasing 
effects of sample selection are of primary concern.  
     My final comments will elaborate on these points 
in the context of the Life Study. Here the basic study 
populations from which samples are drawn (leaving 
aside timing aspects) are (a) k populations of 
pregnant mothers (and partners) associated with k 
maternity units and (b) the population of all live 
births in the UK. I am unclear about the value of k 
(perhaps it remains to be determined) but suppose 
that it is small (under 10?).  Sampling in (a) is by 
census and in (b) by a standard probability scheme 
and so, for the purpose of current discussion and 
leaving aside non-response considerations, I think 
we can disregard issues of representative sampling 
within these populations.  
     In the context of the earlier discussion, the key 
issue relates to the purposive selection of the 
maternity units. Following Goldstein’s discussion, it 
seems natural to ask what is the scientific rationale 
for the choice of maternity units? From Goldstein’s 
paper, the rationale seems to be geographic 
heterogeneity, perhaps associated with differences 
in distributions of what I have called X and Z 
variables relevant to the study.  This raises the 
question of how differences in findings between 
different maternity units are to be interpreted? If, 
for example mortality ratios vary between units as 
in table 1 and there is also significant variation 
between units in a large number of other maternal 
health and socioeconomic factors, how will the 
finding be scientifically informative if k is small? 
Moreover, for some kinds of analyses, 
interpretation may even be complicated by 
confounding between the effect of the maternity 
unit and the nature of the maternal population.  
     In any case, if the results of analyses of data from 
a given maternity unit are only to be reported as 
relating to that population then issues of external 
generalisability are avoided and I have no concerns 
about sample selection bias. There do not then 
seem to be any differences in questions of 
representativity/generalisability compared to other 
geographically specific studies, such as the 
Southampton Women’s Survey (Inskip et al., 2006). 
The fact that scientific studies have some spatial 
and temporal specificity seems inevitable.  
     The more difficult questions relate to how the 
data will be combined across populations. The 
statistical methodology for standard comparisons 
would seem straightforward. Thus, in a regression 
setting, one may construct a categorical covariate 
representing both the k maternity populations and 
the general ‘birth population’, the latter possibly 
broken down by region or in some other 
geographical way. I am still unclear how to interpret 
the coefficients of this covariate and associated 
interaction terms, but this is just the comparative 
question I have already asked above.  
     Much less straightforward seems to me the 
question of how far it will be possible to increase 
“the precision of estimates for nationally 
representative measures” (Dezateux et al., 2013) 
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using the maternity unit data, that is how to use 
data from a restricted and purposefully selected set 
of geographical clusters to make inference about 
the wider UK population? This ‘borrowing of 
strength’ across (a) and (b) is intended to provide, 
as Goldstein refers to it, an optimum design 
combining purposive sampling with population 
representativeness.  
     A review of non-probability sampling was 
conducted recently by the American Association of 
Public Opinion Research, with a summary report 
and discussion appearing in Baker et al. (2013). The 
combination of a national probability sample with a 
small number of geographically clustered 100% 
samples does not appear to be a standard 
approach. Baker et al. (2003) do provide some 
discussion of weighting and note that “the main 
concern with model-based inferences from non-
probability samples is that population estimates are 
highly dependent on model assumptions” (p.97). A 
combination of a large non-probability sample 
(161,000+ web respondents) with a smaller 
‘nationally representative’ quota sample (10,000+ 
respondents) was used in the Great British Class 
survey (Savage et al., 2013).  Savage et al. (2014) 
recognised that their design is ‘unorthodox’, in 
response to criticisms e.g. by Mills (2014), and 
emphasised that their work should be seen as part 
of an ‘experiment’. This survey is very different 
from the Life Study but I mention it just to illustrate 
that such ‘combined’ designs seem to me still novel 
and the extent to which reliable and efficient 
national estimates can be produced by combining 
the separate data sources seems to me a topic still 
in need of further study.  
     ‘Borrowing strength’ is referred to in the small 
area estimation literature (e.g. Ghosh & Rao, 1994), 
but in that context borrowing across geographical 
units comes from fitting a model across a sufficient 
number of such units for a reasonable model to be 
fitted and for valid confidence intervals, taking 
account of geographic heterogeneity, to be 
constructed. It is not clear to me that k will be large 
enough for such an approach to be adopted. 
     Goldstein suggests a weighted approach will be 
used. One approach would be to weight inversely 
by the probability of selection, with weights of one 
attached to members of the maternity unit sample 
(since 100% are sampled). However, I would 
assume this would only increase the effective 
sample size of the birth sample by a small fraction 
and that this is not what is conceived. The idea may 
instead be to construct weighting classes using 
population registry data (but not geography) and 
then to make the modelling assumption that 
observations are exchangeable between the 
maternity unit and birth populations within 
weighting classes. Such a modelling assumption will 
depend upon the relevant analysis and the 
availability of auxiliary information but, in general, 
it would seem to me heroic. The assumption 
should, at least, be testable, although its testing 
would seem to be similar to testing the hypothesis 
of no maternity unit effect in the kind of regression 
analysis I noted above, where weighting variables 
are included as covariates. In summary, the 
proposed combined design seems to me to be novel 
(although perhaps I am unaware of similar designs) 
and I think there are several methodological 
questions regarding data combination to explore, 
even before one gets to the question of software 
tools referred to by Goldstein.   
I am grateful to the Editor for the opportunity to 
discuss this interesting paper.  
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Commentary by Risto Lehtonen University of Helsinki risto.lehtonen@helsinki.fi   
 
 
     I want first to congratulate Harvey Goldstein for 
his inspiring debate paper titled "When and why do 
we need population representative samples?" 
Population representativeness versus sample 
purposefulness has been recently debated in 
epidemiology and social sciences literature. 
Rothman, Gallacher and Hatch (2013a) challenge 
the dominant role of representativeness in 
epidemiology and social and health sciences by 
asking why representativeness should be avoided 
and arguing that "...studies that control skillfully for 
confounding variables and thereby advance our 
understanding of causal mechanisms" offer a 
proper route ahead (1014).  According to Rothman, 
Gallacher and Hatch (2013b) "representativeness, 
although it may have a place in health surveys, is 
not a proper goal for scientific studies" (1027). By 
"scientific studies" he refers to causal studies about 
how nature operates.   
     In his debate paper Goldstein addresses several 
points that remain unclear in Rothman's writing. I 
agree with many of Goldstein’s arguments. Both he 
and Rothman seem to restrict what they call 
"representative sampling" essentially to 
"enumeration" or "population inference" purposes, 
that is, the sample data set is used to estimate the 
parameters of a well-defined finite population, for 
example the prevalence of chronic disease in age-
sex-groups in a given real population at a given time 
point. Later in the paper Goldstein however widens 
his framework beyond that of Rothman. As an 
example, he describes the follow-up study design of 
the British "Life study". For that study he proposes 
the use of additional register-based population 
information (sometimes called auxiliary data), 
supplementing the original study data, for both 
descriptive (enumeration) purposes and for 
studying scientifically interesting hypotheses. He 
considers the combined use of data taken from 
different sources to represent a special case of 
purposive sampling. Goldstein thus proposes a kind 
of hybrid solution: "...an optimum design may well 
be one that combines such purposive sampling with 
population representativeness, so serving both 
enumeration and scientific aims". In my opinion, 
this is a fruitful view and I will try to elaborate this 
approach further in my commentary.  
 What is meant by ‘representativeness’ 
and ‘purposefulness’?  
     Population representativeness 
(representativeness for short) and representative 
sampling are key concepts in Rothman and 
Goldstein’s papers (29 hits in Rothman and 25 in 
Goldstein) but the concept itself remains unclear. 
This is not necessarily a surprise because there is no 
universally accepted definition of 
representativeness or representative sampling. In a 
series of four papers on representative sampling 
published in the International Statistical Review in 
1979 and 1980, William Kruskal and Frederick 
Mosteller give nine different definitions of 
representative sampling they have found in 
scientific literature. All definitions are loose. 
Freshmen may think population representativeness 
refers to a miniature population obtained by 
representative sampling i.e. study subjects are 
selected from the population with an equal chance 
of being included. This interpretation is far too 
simplified because such a design only represents a 
special case of probability sampling. Even if the 
term "representativeness" is rarely used in modern 
survey sampling literature, we might think of 
population representativeness as a procedure 
where the study subjects are selected with a 
specified random mechanism from a well-defined 
finite population, either with equal or varying 
probabilities. If drawn with varying probabilities, 
the structure of the realised sample data set is 
restored (or forced to be "population 
representative") by weighting the observations by 
the inverses of the inclusion probabilities. Obvious 
benefits of probability sampling are in its flexibility 
for a controlled selection of the study subjects and 
in its ability to provide a basis for proper statistical 
inference under the actual sampling design. For 
example, oversampling of understudied groups 
would be covered, as suggested by Rothman. 
However, the scope of representative sampling in 
Rothman's paper seems narrower (this also holds 
for Goldstein's paper). Unequal probability sampling 
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is not explicitly covered, as can be inferred, for 
example, from Rothmans's rebuttal (2013b p. 
1026). When reading both papers it is hard to 
disagree with Kruskal and Mosteller who suggest 
avoiding the use of the concept of 
representativeness. In epidemiological literature, 
the term is occasionally used without clarification 
but it is fair to say that in some cases, a reasonable 
explanation is given (An example is Rothman, 
Greenland & Lash, 2008 p. 146).  
     Purposive sampling is another key concept in 
Goldstein's paper (Rothman does not use the 
concept of purposive sampling). This concept is 
problematic as well. Purposive in what specific 
sense? In Goldstein's paper, purposive sampling 
refers to a sample that is "non-representative of 
any particular real population". Now, it remains 
unclear whether a probability sample from a real 
population becomes "purposive" because of serious 
and informative nonresponse or if, instead of 
probability sampling, a quota sampling method or a 
self-selection scheme has been used or, 
alternatively, if the realised sample data set is being 
interpreted to be "representative" of a fictitious 
superpopulation. Later on I will come back to 
purposive sampling from a survey statistics point of 
view.  
     As a curiosity, there is a certain discrepancy 
between representativeness and purposefulness 
going back to the infancy of probability sampling. In 
a seminal paper entitled "Den repræsentative 
Uildersøgelsesmethode" (The representative 
method of statistical surveys) published in 1897 by 
a Norwegian statistician Anders Kiær, the term 
"representative" appears for the first time in survey 
sampling literature. His main argument was that it is 
not necessary to implement a census to obtain 
useful information on a human population but to 
carry out a "partial investigation".  Fulfilling a well-
specified type of representativeness on the 
population structure, would be enough to make 
inferences on the whole population. But in fact, the 
method of Kiær is a kind of combination of 
representativeness and purposive sampling (see 
e.g. Langel & Tillé, 2011).   
     The contradictory nature of the two key 
concepts, representativeness and purposefulness, 
has given rise to much debate and 
misinterpretation for decades (and the 
contradiction is, implicitly or explicitly, visible in 
both Rothman and Goldstein's papers). The 
discriminatory power of the terms is weak as is 
evident from example in the paper by Goldstein. As 
the climax of his paper, a certain type of data 
combination appears effectively to be both 
purposive and representative, indicating a complete 
overlap of the concepts. So, we are back in Kiaer!  
The hybrid solution revisited  
     Let me elaborate further Goldstein’s hybrid 
solution by using ideas from modern survey 
statistics. The key idea is to successfully combine, in 
one way or another, methods used in the sampling 
phase for the selection of study subjects and the 
methods used in the analysis of the study data. In 
both sampling and analysis phases, auxiliary 
population data taken from administrative registers 
or censuses and statistical modelling can play a 
crucial role. For example, in balanced sampling 
(Deville & Tillé 2004) the sample is forced to fit with 
the known population distribution of selected 
auxiliary variables, in effect representing purposive 
sampling with properly defined inclusion 
probabilities. In the analysis phase, the effect of 
varying inclusion probabilities caused by balancing 
can be adjusted for by weighting the sample 
observations with inverse inclusion probabilities, 
which is a standard survey analysis practice. 
Alternatively, the effect of balancing can be 
accounted for by including the balancing variables 
as potential explanatory variables in the statistical 
model to be fitted to the study data set, 
representing a possible model-based way of 
treating sampling complexities. As an extension for 
the analysis phase, statistical calibration techniques 
(e.g. Särndal, 2007) offer methods for the 
construction of calibrated weights that force the 
sample distribution of selected auxiliary variables 
(covariates; e.g. demographic, socioeconomic etc.) 
to fit with a known population distribution. The 
weights (possibly combined with the original survey 
weights) are then supplied to the analysis 
procedure (as weight variables or covariates). 
Thompson (2015) addresses complex longitudinal 
surveys from both a survey analysis and model-
based analysis point of view. Gelman (2007) 
discusses weighting in the context of Bayesian 
analysis.  
     In my opinion, the hybrid design of combining 
the study data, the available auxiliary population 
data and statistical modelling fulfils many of the 
properties of an optimal design introduced by  
Goldstein. There are many favourable properties in 
COMMENT AND DEBATE 
   
 
471 
this approach. The combined methodology offers a 
useful tool for the balancing of the sample 
distribution of important confounders against the 
known distributions at the population level, needed 
in studies based on purposive sampling and in 
probability samples that suffer from severe and 
informative nonresponse and selective attrition. 
Protection against model mis-specification can be 
attained for superpopulation-based approaches. If 
the inferential framework is model-based, the 
auxiliary variables (or the constructed weight 
variable) - featuring important aspects of the 
sampling design and nonresponse patterns - might 
be included as covariates in the statistical model to 
be fitted in the analysis phase. Effective adjustment 
for informative nonresponse and attrition can be 
attained if the auxiliary variables correlate with the 
response mechanism. Moreover, improved 
accuracy is possible if the auxiliary variables 
correlate with the study variables. 
     Obviously, the hybrid methodology can be very 
effective in "enumeration studies" where 
probability sampling (with equal or unequal 
inclusion probabilities) plays an important role, 
even if the inferential frameworks may differ. This is 
because probability sampling offers a firm basis for 
statistical inference in any empirical science. With 
certain restrictions, the methods are applicable for 
non-probability samples as well. In "scientific 
studies", the approach can be used for example to 
protect against the possible selection bias of study 
subjects. Moreover, the methodology toolbox fades 
out the unnecessary or even harmful confrontation 
between “scientific studies” and “enumeration 
studies”, because with appropriate choices the 
methodology applies to both.  
 Requirements for data infrastructure  
      The power of the hybrid machinery described 
above depends on the data infrastructure 
accessible to the researcher. Even if there are huge 
differences in this respect between countries, 
aggregate-level auxiliary data on demography, 
health and social affairs are often available in 
population censuses, official statistics and 
administrative registers, fulfilling minimum 
requirements for the methodology. The British "Life 
study" described by Goldstein offers a good 
example. Li, Li and Graubard. (2011) illustrate the 
importance of accounting for the complexities of 
the study design (stratified multi-stage sampling 
involving intra-cluster correlation, informative 
nonresponse accounted for with weighting and 
calibration to census totals) in order to obtain valid 
inference in a genetic study. The study shows the 
potential of the combined methodology in a data 
infrastructure where aggregate-level census data 
are available.  
     In the so-called register countries, notably in the 
Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, unit-level data on various 
auxiliary variables are available from statistical 
register and from administrative sources for 
scientific research in epidemiology and social and 
health sciences. Examples of data sources are 
health registers and registers on socio-economic 
conditions (see e.g. Gissler & Haukka, 2004). In such 
an infrastructure, the various administrative 
register files can be linked cross-sectionally at the 
unit level and also in a panel fashion. The 
combination of the administrative data sources into 
integrated statistical registers at the unit level is 
based on unique identifiers such as personal 
identification numbers. In many cases, records from 
the register databases can be linked with the 
original study data records at the unit level, giving 
much flexibility in the combined use of the various 
data sources. Jousilahti, Salomaa, Kuulasmaa, 
Niemelä & Vartiainen (2005) provides an example 
of data linkage and the use of combined 
information in examining drop-out and attrition 
structures in a health study conducted in a register-
based data infrastructure. Fortunately, in many 
countries such data infrastructures are becoming 
accessible for scientific research and public 
statistics purposes.  
Conclusion  
      From the statistical methodology perspective, 
the dichotomy between “scientific inference” and 
“population inference” is restrictive and prevents 
full utilisation of the potential of modern statistical 
apparatus and today’s emerging data 
infrastructures. Alongside relaxing this dichotomy, 
the confrontation of representativeness and 
purposefulness becomes unnecessary and can be 
dropped from the researcher’s terminology toolbox. 
It will also be necessary to introduce up-to-date 
materials in university courses in epidemiology on 
such topics as sampling and data integration and 
statistical record linkage techniques as well as 
analysis methods for complex study data. I agree 
with Goldstein’s comment on the importance of 
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access to suitable statistical software in exploiting a 
combined study design.  
     Goldstein seems to neglect somewhat the 
potential of probability sampling as an important 
phase of the research process but I think that an 
obituary for probability sampling is premature.  
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     I am very pleased that my original piece has 
stimulated an excellent set of thoughtful responses. 
Reading through these has given me greater insight 
into the issues and also persuaded me to clarify 
some of my views, especially on the role of 
scientific inference. I shall begin by reflecting on the 
terms that I used since I think that there may be 
some misunderstanding of my intentions, no doubt 
through insufficient elaboration originally on my 
part. I welcome the opportunity to provide 
elaboration and am grateful to all the contributors 
for their responses. 
     I use the term ‘real’ population, in the same 
sense as Kish (1965, chapter 1) to mean a finite set 
of units that, at least in principle, can be 
enumerated. The intention behind the use of the 
term ‘purposive’ sampling is to reflect sampling 
from a theoretically defined frame of reference but 
one that does not necessarily correspond to such a 
population. Thus, the pregnancy component of Life 
Study is well defined as all the pregnant women 
attending a set of maternity units. The sample is 
chosen as those attending over a given time period 
of four years. Here, the concept of a 
‘superpopulation’ is a key one, namely that any 
scientific inference that is based upon a sample 
chosen at a particular time is intended to apply 
more generally across a time period, a point 
elaborated by Peter Lynn. We may also wish any 
inferences we make to apply across space, and both 
these concerns need to be addressed within a 
standard scientific framework as I elaborate below.  
     Such a sample indeed might consist of all the 
members of a ‘real’ population, such as the set of 
children attending primary school in England in year 
three of their education. Yet scientific inferences 
about, for example, the relationships between year 
three childrens’ school performance and 
background factors such as ethnic group, need to 
postulate a superpopulation model, and we would 
apply basically the same modelling procedures 
whether the full population of year three children 
or a random sample from it, i.e. with known 
probability of selection, had been chosen. In Life 
Study, the chosen women would not conventionally 
be regarded as constituting a probabilistically 
selected sample from a real geographic population 
in terms of a fixed time period and by where they 
live (rather than where they attend), especially as 
the criteria for being able to attend may change 
over time, for example in terms of residence or 
referrals. Nevertheless, for scientific inference 
purposes, given suitable statistical adjustments, for 
example to correct for selection biases, we may 
apply our standard statistical modelling procedures 
where we attempt to make inferences conditional 
on individual characteristics such as ethnic origin 
etc., and we can see that the distinction between a 
purposive sample and one derived probabilistically 
from a real population becomes less clear and 
certainly less important. Let me be clear also that I 
certainly do not use the term ‘purposive’, in one of 
the senses discussed by Risto Lehtonen, namely as a 
sample that has become biased through selective 
non-response. As he mentions, an interesting 
example of purposive sampling is quota sampling 
where sample members are selected for certain 
characteristics they happen to possess. Of course, 
this is not based upon a clear probabilistic 
mechanism, but if we are prepared to assume that 
the selection process has not differentially sampled 
individuals who have other characteristics that 
mediate the relationships of interest, then we will 
be justified in applying our models to study the 
relationships of interest. One task for the data 
analyst is to try to satisfy such an assumption. 
     The key idea is that it is the underlying social and 
biological processes that produce an actual set of 
individuals, that are the real objects of inference, 
and we are making use of the biological and social 
realisation of these at a particular historical time to 
select a sample from which we may make 
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inferences. Unless we make an assumption of this 
kind, what we describe is, strictly logically, only of 
historical interest, although of course, for the 
purpose of enumeration or, say, resource 
allocation, this may be appropriate.  Furthermore, 
of course, we also need to assume that the process 
that generates the actual data is essentially 
probabilistic in order to make inferences about the 
parameters in our statistical models, and in addition 
that we have data that allows us to adjust for 
factors such as differential non-response that could 
otherwise lead to biases. 
     Thus, the Life Study maternity component 
samples all women over a period attending the 
maternity units, but it is the superpopulation that 
‘generates’ this group that is of scientific interest 
and that, conditional on observables, the 
generation process is assumed random.  I accept 
that there is a vagueness here that contrasts with 
the strictly defined procedures of the conventional 
survey framework for selecting probability samples 
from actual ‘real’ populations, but it seems to me 
that we need to accept this in the spirit that 
whatever inferences we come up with are subject 
to the strict scientific tests of replication and 
falsification. These tests are what I was trying to 
illustrate in discussing the studies of pregnancy 
smoking and mortality. Thus, I concur with Colm 
O’Muircheartaigh’s remarks about the importance 
of samples that have a probabilistic basis, since this 
is fundamental to statistical modelling, but I also 
contend that such a probabilistic basis is consistent 
with a superpopulation approach. The points made 
by Graciela Muniz and Rebecca Hardy about the 
importance of replication and generalisation are 
helpful here.  I hope that my original intentions may 
now be clearer, especially in the light of Peter 
Lynn’s useful discussion of real and super - 
population definitions. 
     I think my original use of the term ‘real 
population’ and a ‘purposive’ sample may have led 
to some misunderstandings.  Thus Colm 
O’Muircheartaigh points out that had we taken 
notice of the study across the whole of the US 
where there is considerable heterogeneity, rather 
than the private health one or the Swedish one, we 
could have observed the positive relationship 
between percentage low-birth weight and mortality 
ratio that I presented. Rather than undermining my 
point, however, that is precisely my contention in 
that it is the heterogeneity present in the sample 
rather than the fact that it allows inference to any 
particular geographically well-defined population, 
that is of key importance.  I particularly welcome 
Risto Lehtonen’s discussion of purposive sampling 
and how, for example by the use of properly 
specified inclusion probabilities, weights and 
covariate adjustment, such samples can be brought 
within a standard statistical modelling framework. 
     Turning again to my illustrative example of Life 
Study, choosing to sample from maternity units was 
not, as Chris Skinner suggests, based on ‘geographic 
homogeneity’, but the practical one that this was 
the only way to obtain high quality prenatal 
measurements. He is right that there will no doubt 
be important differences among maternity units in 
different parts of the country and one aim of 
analysis will be to explore and attempt to account 
for these. This is part of the scientific process of 
replication. In fact in the case of long term 
longitudinal studies, apart from the relatively small 
number of national cohort studies in the UK and 
elsewhere such as the US, Canada, the Nordic 
countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand and Australia,  most are samples of small 
geographic regions, institutions or other restricted 
groups. Indeed, the 1946, 1958 and 1970 British 
cohort studies sampled all births in just one week, 
in one sense a real population, but certainly not the 
target population of interest.  The scientific value of 
such studies lies not primarily in their general 
representativeness but in their heterogeneity, their 
ability to explore rich data and ultimately in the 
possibilities for comparison and replication. In the 
case of Life Study, access to the national population 
births register and also to local population data, 
containing birth and demographic variables, also 
allows us to post-stratify the sample and to adjust 
for differential non-response by conditioning on 
such data. It will also allow us to compute weights 
so that it can be used together with the parallel 
national probability sample in Life Study to provide 
efficient combined analyses, the ‘borrowing 
strength’ that Chris Skinner refers to. While he is 
correct that it adds relatively little national 
information, it will provide the user with a 
consistent and large combined dataset that 
contains both sample components. Thus, depending 
on the purpose of any particular analysis and using 
appropriate weights, one may certainly treat the 
overall sample as ‘representative’ of a real 
population (over an intended four year period), but 
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one may also treat it as a realisation of a 
superpopulation process. I do agree that such 
designs are non-traditional and would benefit from 
further study, and Risto Lehtonen’s remarks under 
the ‘hybrid model’ heading provide a useful 
elaboration of the basic idea, and his illustration 
from registers constituting a data ‘infrastructure’ 
for removing sample bias in Nordic countries is 
interesting.  
     I’m grateful to Graciela Muniz and Rebecca 
Hardy for usefully illuminating all these issues with 
their discussion of cohort studies and especially 
how difficult the concept of representativeness of a 
real population becomes over time. They also 
elaborate on the need for replication and 
reproducibility and how this may be achieved, with 
some well-chosen examples. 
     Since preparing my original article, an interesting 
paper has been read to the Royal Statistical Society 
by Keiding and Louis ( 2015) that has a detailed 
exploration of many of these issues and explicitly 
comments on the articles by Rothman and 
colleagues (2013). They argue, I think correctly, that 
in some respects Rothman and colleagues overstate 
their case. Keiding and Louis particularly draw 
attention to the problem of informative differential 
non-response that can threaten the validity of any 
inferences, and I fully concur with this as a major 
issue for all types of study. They also take the view 
that “The real representativity issue is whether the 
conditional effects that we wish to transport (to 
other times and places) are actually transportable”. 
This echoes my remarks about conditioning on 
known population data to avoid selection bias. I 
think that the Keiding and Louis paper, however, is 
less clear about the relationship between scientific 
inference and inferences to a well-specified 
population. As I pointed out in the case of the 
smoking in pregnancy studies, the characteristics of 
some populations may make them quite unsuitable 
for purposes of scientific explanation.  
      Despite remaining differences I am encouraged 
that there is a general agreement that these issues 
are useful ones to discuss and I have no doubt that 
there will be plenty more to say in the future.  
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